



Battle of Shiloh Staff Ride

In February of 1862, the Confederate States of America outposted and patrolled an extensive “fireline” along their northwest boundary. With “ignition” on February 6th at Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, a moderate-size “fire” made a strong run towards Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River about 12 miles to the East. By February 16th 15,000 confederate fighters were entrapped. There were three largely co-equal confederate “incident commanders” leading the resources at Fort Donelson – Confederate Brigadiers John Floyd, Gideon Pillow, and Simon Bolivar Buckner.

How does this historic scenario relate to the South Canyon Fire of 1994? Are there some similarities in leadership and command relationships that we can learn from?

One of the mid-level confederate leaders in 1862, Nathan Bedford Forrest, refused orders to “deploy shelters” and be burned over. “Old Bedford” sent forward lookouts, and stayed in communication with them; he determined escape routes, and successfully followed those routes to safety zones. Forrest devised an innovative escape plan and led others to safety. Most of his men followed him – but some refused and did not. Why was that? In 1949 at Mann Gulch, Wagner Dodge devised an innovative escape plan too, but no one followed him into the escape fire.

What techniques do you use as a leader to build unit cohesion? How do you gain and maintain trust relationships between all those entrusted to your care? How do you personally prepare to lead your organizations through perilous situations to safety? Are you prepared to clearly and effectively communicate your intent to others in a fluid and dynamic environment? How much will you personally sacrifice to protect those in your charge?

Over the course of two full days we invite you to share your ideas on leadership at the battleground around Shiloh Church. Here in April of 1862, roughly 100,000 Americans faced desperate peril on the banks of the Tennessee River. Put yourself in the place of their leaders as we visit the locations where key decisions were made. Practice with your discussion groups the art of **communicating** as receivers by sensing the reports and conditions, **understanding** the desperate situation you face, **deciding** what to do, and **communicating** your decisions in order to effect action.

The leaders involved in this major 1862 incident were all real folks – just like us – who found themselves leading their organizations through violent uncertain circumstances that unfolded very rapidly. They communicated, understood, decided, and then communicated their decisions into action – just like we must do. Using this major historical incident as a setting, we gather fire fighting leaders to discuss leadership techniques relevant to incident management in the 21st century, and the responsibility we bear for our Nation. Thank you in advance for your meaningful participation in this event.



Remembrances of a Private and a Captain – 6 April 1862



"Those savage yells, and the sight of thousands of racing figures coming towards them, discomfited the blue-coats; and when we arrived upon the place where they had stood, they had vanished. Then **we caught sight of their beautiful array of tents, before which they had made their stand**, after being roused from their Sunday-morning sleep, and huddled into line, at hearing their pickets challenge our skirmishers. The half-dressed dead and wounded showed what a surprise our attack had been. After being exposed for a few seconds to this fearful downpour, we heard the order to 'Lie down, men, and continue your firing!' Before me was a prostrate tree, about fifteen inches in diameter, with a narrow strip of light between it and the ground. Behind this shelter a dozen of us flung ourselves. The security it appeared to offer restored me to my individuality. We could fight, and think, and observe, better than out in the open. But it was a terrible period! How the cannon bellowed, and their shells plunged and bounded, and flew with screeching hisses over us! Their sharp rending explosions and hurtling fragments made us shrink and cower, despite our utmost efforts to be cool and collected. I marveled, as I heard the unintermitting patter, snip, thud, and hum of the bullets, how anyone could live under this raining death. I could hear the balls beating a merciless tattoo on the outer surface of the log, pinging vivaciously as they flew off at a tangent from it, and thudding into something or other, at the rate of a hundred a second. One, here and there, found its way under the log, and buried itself in a comrade's body."

Private Henry Morton Stanley
6th Arkansas Infantry















"The position between the tents was manifestly untenable. The Colonel was still very much excited and seemingly in no condition to receive suggestions, so I sought Lieutenant-Colonel Parker and gave him my view of the situation. He agreed with me, but unfortunately these two officers were at outs and had not spoken with each other in several days. The Major was absent, so the necessity devolved upon me, as Acting Adjutant to, at least consult with the Colonel. Approaching him with in a conciliatory tone I remarked: "this position between the tents does not seem tenable. Had you not better retire the regiment to higher ground across the ravine in our rear. You will still be practically in line with the 70th and also with the 72nd which is already across the ravine?" "I was ordered to conform with the 70th and form a new line on the Purdy road. Here I am going to stay until ordered back by competent authority". The Colonel was right about conforming, but wrong about the road, for the one upon which he stood was only a spur leading into the Purdy. Just then the 70th showed signs of retiring. Things looked desperate, for the 'rebs' were not only showing themselves above the hill in our front but, having dissipated Hildebrand's Brigade to the left of the chapel, were appearing on the left front of the 70th. Again approaching the Lieutenant-Colonel I suggested that he give the command to retire. "The Colonel is in command" was his reply. Then here gos and I yelled: "Attention 48th. About face, guide center, March!" The Colonel, frantic with rage, rushed along the line, exclaiming: "Show me the man who gave that order. I'll cut his head off!" Years afterwards, in New York, I met Col. Sullivan and while his guest at dinner, at the old Metropolitan Hotel on Broadway, I asked him if he had ever discovered who it was that gave the order to retire from between the tents at Shiloh. "I had a suspicion at the time that it was you, I realized after the battle that, under the existing conditions, it was the one thing to do, and I believe now that the move saved the regiment from possible annihilation - certainly from capture. Had I known, however, at the time that the order was uttered by you it is more than possible I should have you shot down".







Captain F. M. Posegate
48th Ohio Volunteer Infantry

Leaders – Good, Bad, and Ugly

Below are the principle leaders whose decisions affected the lives of men like Stanley and Posegate.

Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio		Army of Mississippi	
Ulysses S. Grant (born Hiram Ulysses Grant ; April 27, 1822 – July 23, 1885) – Commanding Army of the Tennessee. Age at Shiloh: 40 Home State: Ohio		Albert Sidney Johnston (February 2, 1803 – April 6, 1862) – Commanding Army of Mississippi Age at Shiloh: 59 Home State: Kentucky	
Don Carlos Buell (March 23, 1818 – November 19, 1898) – Commanding Army of the Ohio Age at Shiloh: 44 Home State: Ohio		Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard (May 28, 1818 – February 20, 1893) – Commander and Deputy Commander, Army of Mississippi Age at Shiloh: 44 Home State: Louisiana	
John Alexander McClernand (May 30, 1812 – September 20, 1900) – Commanding 1 st Division, Army of the Tennessee Age at Shiloh: 50 Home State: Illinois		Leonidas Polk (April 10, 1806 – June 14, 1864) – Commanding First confederate corps. Age at Shiloh: 56 Home State: North Carolina	
Lewis "Lew" Wallace (April 10, 1827 – February 15, 1905) – Commanding 3 rd Division, Army of the Tennessee Age at Shiloh: 35 Home State: Indiana		Braxton Bragg (March 22, 1817 – September 27, 1876) – Commanding Second confederate corps. Age at Shiloh: 45 Home State: North Carolina	
William Hervey Lamme Wallace (July 8, 1821 – April 10, 1862) – Commanding 2 nd Division, Army of the Tennessee Age at Shiloh: 41 Home State: Ohio		William Joseph Hardee (October 12, 1815 – November 6, 1873) – Commanding Third confederate corps Age at Shiloh: 47 Home State: Georgia	
Benjamin Mayberry Prentiss (November 23, 1819 – February 8, 1901) – Commanding 6 th Division, Army of the Tennessee Age at Shiloh: 39 Home State: Virginia		John Cabell Breckinridge (January 16, 1821 – May 17, 1875) – Commanding Fourth confederate corps Age at Shiloh: 41 Home State: Kentucky	
William Tecumseh Sherman (February 8, 1820 – February 14, 1891) – Commanding 5 th Division, Army of the Tennessee Age at Shiloh: 42 Home State: Ohio		Nathan Bedford Forrest (July 13, 1821 – October 29, 1877) – Commanding Tennessee Cavalry Regiment Age at Shiloh: 41 Home State: Tennessee	

The Organizations and Common Military Unit Map Symbols

Unit Symbol	Description and Analogy
 <p style="text-align: center;">Army</p>	<p>An Army (XXXX) operates with near-complete independence, charged to integrate all the elements of national power (military, economic, political, and informational) into its actions. It is commanded by a General, and can be thought of as analogous to Area Command. Three Armies fought at Shiloh – the Army of the Tennessee (Federal about 50,000 strong) the Army of the Ohio (Federal about 20,000 strong) and the Army of Mississippi (Confederate about 48,000 strong).</p>
 <p style="text-align: center;">Corps</p>	<p>A Corps (XXX) operates as part of an Army, but is often assigned to conduct independent operations. It is commanded by a Lieutenant General, and generally has a “combined arms” force of infantry, artillery, cavalry, and logistics. It is analogous to Incident Command controlling all resources. Federal Corps were typically smaller organizations of about 12,000 men; Confederate Corps typically larger at around 25,000. At Shiloh the Federal Armies were not yet organized into Corps, while the Confederate Army was (4 Corps of about only 12,000 each)</p>
 <p style="text-align: center;">Division</p>	<p>A Division (XX) is a specialized unit of about 6,000 men that operates as part of a Corps. Commanded by a Major General. The symbol to the left shows an Infantry Division depicted with “crossed rifles” in the box in the form of an X. A Division is responsible for a part of the Corps’ fighting line, and can be thought of the same way as a Division on an extended attack fire.</p>
 <p style="text-align: center;">Brigade</p>	<p>A Brigade (X) is a specialized subset of a Division, generally with about 1,000 men. Commanded by a Brigadier General or a Colonel. The symbol to the left shows a Cavalry Brigade depicted with one “drawn saber” (a slash “/”) to show that it’s cavalry.</p>
 <p style="text-align: center;">Regiment</p>	<p>A Regiment (III) is a specialized subset of a Brigade, generally with about 500 men, although technically it should consist of 10 companies of infantry, with each company having 100 men. Commanded by a Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel. The symbol to the left shows an Infantry Regiment.</p>
 <p style="text-align: center;">Battalion</p>	<p>A Battalion (II) is generally used as an organization of artillery batteries – and in rare instances a grouping of infantry companies within a Regiment. Commanded by a Major. The symbol to the left shows an Artillery Battalion with a cannon-ball in the middle. Cavalry would use the term “squadron” in place of “battalion” for multiple “troops” of cavalry later in the war.</p>